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Shinran’s Neglect of Emptiness
John  P. Keenan
HE rise of Mahayana Buddhism is most often depicted by scholars as
the rise of the doctrine of emptiness, heralded by the early Prajnapara-
-A  mita scriptures with their broad critique of Abhidharma realism. The 
doctrine of emptiness (sizrcyata) took direct aim at the Abhidharma idea that 
things possess truly existent essences (dharma-svabhava), and proclaimed 
that all things are empty specifically of essence (svabhdva-sunyata). The de­
velopment of Mahayana doctrine in large part turns upon this critique.
While the eighteen schools of the so-called Hlnayana branch of Buddhism 
taught no-self (atma-sunyata), Mahayana insisted on the emptiness o f all 
things (dharma-sunyatd). The Prajnaparamita scriptures even declared the 
Buddha to be empty o f any fixed essence. Subsequently, the Madhyamika 
sage Nagarjuna developed his “logic of emptiness,” which subjected any 
and all essentialist claims to emptying refutation. His Stanzas on the Middle 
take aim, chapter by chapter, at a series of Abhidharma affirmations deemed 
to presuppose the real existence o f anything.
It is true that it has been rather difficult to identify exactly which philo­
sophic notions each chapter of The Stanzas on the Middle is intended to 
refute, just who held such notions, and even perhaps just how in particular 
cases Madhyamika logic carries the day. Most Mahayana scholars, however, 
both traditional and modem, do not preoccupy themselves with reconstruct­
ing Nagarjuna’s original context, but draw upon a relatively small number of 
passages in The Stanzas on the Middle, passages that present Madhyamika 
with a more direct impact: primarily those treating emptiness and dependent
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co-arising, and the two truths. From this rather meager store, these thinkers 
then proceed to develop the basic contours of Mahayana philosophy, where­
in emptiness is taught as coterminous with dependent co-arising, and the two 
truths of ultimate meaning and worldly convention are described as totally 
disjunctive.1
1 The main theme ofNagao Gadjin’s The Foundational Standpoint o f Madhyamika Philos­
ophy. Trans, by John P. Keenan. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).
2 Hirota et al.1997 (hereafter CWS) I: 361.
It does appear to be true that, even when clearly identified, the specific an­
cient Abhidharma notions that Nagarjuna countered were never widely held, 
even in the medieval period. Most people never do become philosophers, 
skilled in the use of any theoretical language. And yet Madhyamika itself, 
with its doctrine of emptiness, is so central to Mahayana Buddhism that it is 
never deemed as just of historical import, some relic of an outdated argu­
ment. Rather, as the flagship philosophy of Mahayana, emptiness refutes the 
assumption that any viewpoint clung to as the correct truth could possibly 
capture the core meaning of reality. Madhyamika claims to have no view­
point of its own, merely to refute the viewpoint of others, so that, no longer 
in thrall to ideas and judgments, all people may empty their minds and be 
awakened. So, even though most people no longer hold the classical view­
points critiqued by Nagarjuna, Madhyamika can still take aim at whatever 
essentialist notion they may hold.
The place of Nagarjuna in Buddhist doctrinal history is unparalleled by 
any other thinker, not just because he refuted false views held long ago, but 
because in so doing he offered a pattern of philosophic thought that could be 
and has been adapted to many different contexts. Nagarjuna is recognized as 
the patriarch of some eight schools of East Asian Buddhism, and has been 
employed by western Buddhist thinkers to negate the assumptions of any 
number of viewpoints—Cartesian, Platonic, Scholastic, Straussian.
As the first of the patriarchs Nagarjuna is recognized by Shinran in his 
Pure Land lineage. And yet, curiously, Shinran completely ignores the 
Prajnaparamita and the Madhyamika doctrine of emptiness. Shinran knows 
that Nagarjuna wrote his commentary on the Mahdprajndpdramitd-sutra 
(Ta-chih-tu. Inn) to “crush the wrong views of being and nonbeing,”2 but he 
himself never cites Prajnaparamita texts directly. He never even mentions 
Nagarjuna’s Stanzas on the Middle. When he does employ the term “ empti­
ness,” he usually means “unreal,” “useless,” or “vain.” In his Notes on ‘Es-
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sentials o f  Faith A lone’, he declares that the reason people should not out­
wardly behave as though wise or good is that “inwardly they are empty and 
transitory.”3 Similarly, true faith is “free from that which is empty and tran­
sitory.”4 To be empty here signifies “to be bereft, to be lacking, to feel lost, 
or at a loss.”




7 And would thus be subject to Matsumoto Shiro’s critique against dhatuvdda.
8 See The Lotus Sutra, Watson trans. 1993, p.49.
Furthermore, Shinran appears to demote Nagarjuna from his usual status 
as a fully awakened bodhisattva. He describes him as having “attained the 
stage of joy ,” merely the initial bodhisattva stage.5 According to Shinran, 
Nagarjuna did distinguish the difficult from the easy path, but he himself 
practiced the difficult path, thus reaching only the first stage of the bodhi­
sattva career.
In Shinran’s marginalization o f the Prajnaparamita teaching of emptiness, I 
suspect, he parts from the mainstream of the Mahayana tradition. He teaches 
that the reality of the Dharma is centered in the reality of the Primal Vow, the 
reality of shinjin, embodied in the recitation of nembutsu. He accepts the 
teaching of the Nirvdnasutra that “the Dharma Body is eternity, bliss, self, 
and purity,”6 the four perfections celebrated in the Tathagatagarbha tradi­
tion. That Tathagatagarbha tradition limits the scope of emptiness to defile­
ments, and refuses to apply it to the reality of the true Buddha mind—in 
Shinran’s case, the mind of Amida Buddha acting as the Other Power in the 
lives of faithful practicers.7 8 The question this raises in my mind is: Why? 
What are the implications of Shinran’s neglect of the doctrine of emptiness? 
Why does he marginalize the teaching of emptiness? Why does he interpret 
emptiness simply to mean “uselessness, inanity”? Why does he limit his 
reading of Nagarjuna to the Jujiibibasha ron, which does not thematize 
emptiness at all? Tendai, Kegon, and the other schools of Japanese 
Mahayana glory in disquisitions on emptiness; the Lotus Scripture and the 
traditions that developed from that scripture focus on the eternal Buddha, but 
still they profess the “law of emptiness,” the ground for the very central 
teaching of the Buddha’s skillful updyaL Yet Shinran and Shin Buddhism in 
general ignore it, to the point where some have wondered if Shin Buddhism 
merits inclusion as a Mahayana school at all. Is it not rather focused on the
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denial of self-power, much as the so-called Hinayana schools focused single- 
mindedly on no-self?
The Neglect o f  Emptiness as Upaya: The Needs o f  the People Outweigh the 
Purity o f  the Teaching
There is a traditional explanation for Shinran’s neglect of emptiness: that 
emptiness is not a skillful teaching for this latter, degenerate age, wherein 
people are existentially unable to grasp the import of such a subtle teaching. 
A clear and typical formulation of this explanation is found in Shunjo’s biog­
raphy of Honen:
Entering through the gateways of [the Buddha’s] teachings, people 
have, according to their several capacities, found manifold bene­
fits. Among the teachings, that which is called the Holy Path 
(shodo) promises enlightenment to people in this sinful world, 
through the power of their own exertions. But we fear that the 
present age has become so degenerate, and people’s minds so 
beclouded, that they are no longer able clearly to apprehend the 
profound truth of the emptiness of self and things, and, in their 
eagerness for the things of time and sense, they will with diffi­
culty escape from the fires of the three dread evils. There is, how­
ever, but one Gate, through which common people, with all their 
evil passions bom of illusion, may enter immediately at death upon 
the state of deliverance from the fated transmigration, and that is 
the Pure Land (Jodo).9 [translation modernized here]
Indeed, Nagarjuna in his Stanzas on the Middle presented emptiness with 
the purpose of refuting the false ideas of those who insisted on the truth of 
their own views. But the obstacles that obtain in the degenerate age consist 
more in attachment to objects of sense passion and the deluded quest to con­
trol one’s entire fate. These are not intellectual viewpoints but rather exis­
tential states of entrapped consciousness. Their antidote is not a teaching on 
the emptiness o f false viewpoints, but rather an instruction on the pointless­
ness of such disordered states of consciousness. Indeed, Nagarjuna himself 
was not just a deconstructive thinker, but also a bodhisattva who wrote many 
other tracts aimed at encouraging devotional practices to liberate people 
from their attachments.
9 Coates and Ishizuka 1925, pp.86-87.
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This is the attitude that seems to characterize Shinran, for he does seem 
unconcerned with intellectuals and their viewpoints, until those viewpoints 
begin to impinge on Shinshu doctrine itself. Still, he addresses himself to 
more ordinary people, attempting to inculcate the practice of nembutsu as a 
counter to the overarching need of people to be in control of their own sal­
vation, their own fate. To abandon oneself to the Other Power of Amida and 
to accept entrance into the state of the truly settled as a gift freely given—that 
is the point.
And the chief obstacle to such settlement is not intellectual viewpoints, but 
self-clinging: the persistent and polymorphous moves of self-aggrandizing 
calculations (hakarat). Such calculations may of course take the guise of 
philosophical views, but ordinarily and for the most part views are not the 
danger sensed by Shinran to be most threatening. And thus the founder of 
Japanese Shin Buddhism did not feel constrained to say very much about 
emptiness. And he never discoursed on dependent co-arising. Certainly he 
did not stress the identity between the two. As a result, Pure Land practicers, 
with the exception of those who have studied at university, are rarely famil­
iar with these Mahayana philosophic insights.10
10 Some fifteen years ago, Whalen Lai remarked that his grandmother, a practicer of Pure 
Land all her life, had never heard about emptiness and dependent co-arising. It is that remark 
that reverberates in the back of my mind when I read Shinran.
11 Pas 1995, pp.156-57: “If newly aroused bodhisattvas would hear that all the dharmas 
are ultimately void in their nature and that even nirvana is a creation, their minds would be 
greatly frightened. For their sake the distinction is made: dharmas which have a rising-and- 
ceasing are created; dharmas that neither arise nor cease, are not created.”
In this reading, then, Shinran ignores the teaching of emptiness because it 
is not relevant to his time and place, not appropriate for this latter, degener­
ate age. No matter how central to the rise of Mahayana, emptiness was not 
central to Pure Land practice. And Shinran was not alone in making this 
move. Chinese Pure Land thinker Shan-tao also treats emptiness, the most 
profound of insights, as unsuited to a broad audience. He repeats the text of 
the Kuan Wu-Liang-Shou-Fo Ching.11 The Larger Prajhaparamita Sutra 
had reported a dialogue between Buddha and Subhuti, in which Buddha 
identifies emptiness itself as nirvana. The passage states:
All dharmas are characterized by equality and are not creations of 
sravakas and so forth; emptiness itself is nirvana. If bodhisattvas 
who have newly awakened aspiration hear that all dharmas are 
ultimately empty and so on, and that even nirvana is illusion, their
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hearts will be seized with surprise and fear. For the sake of bodhi­
sattvas who have newly awakened aspiration, I deliberately made 
a distinction, saying that what arises and perishes is illusion, while 
that which neither arises nor perishes is not illusion.12
12 CWS I: 199.
13 Ibid., p.89.
Indeed, it seems quite clear that Shinran’s reason for avoiding emptiness was 
precisely because it was not a skillful teaching. He quotes Shan-tao to the 
point:
In this way, you should undertake practice in accord with your 
opportunities and conditions and seek emancipation. Why do you 
obstruct and confuse me with what is not the essential practice cor­
responding to my conditions? What I desire is the practice corre­
sponding to my conditions; that is not what you seek. What you 
desire is the practice corresponding to your conditions; that is not 
w hat/seek. Each person’s performance of practices in accord with 
his aspirations unfailingly leads to rapid emancipation.13
Shinran focuses on what is existentially central. However, he does not 
merely treat emptiness as a profound if inaccessible teaching; he hardly 
treats it at all. The above passage is the only citation from a Prajnaparamita 
text to be found in his Teaching, Practice, and Realization. He appears not 
only to be neglecting emptiness, but to be avoiding it like the plague.
How could Shinran not in some way or other have treated this central 
Mahayana doctrine? It is the teaching of emptiness that enables Mahayana 
teachers to employ the very notion and the practice of upaya. And even 
though emptiness might be deemed difficult to understand, other Mahayana 
thinkers who focused on Buddha nature or the pure mind of original awak­
ening did thematize it. Even granting that Shinran’s focus was on the exis­
tential and not on intellectuals, those who hold views, does it follow that he 
should fail to treat emptiness so completely?
Perhaps Shinran was so focused upon the true teaching of Pure Land, and 
so opposed to false Pure Land views, that he found unacceptable the idea that 
all views are empty. But this defends Shinran only to imply as a consequence 
that his understanding of Pure Land did, in fact, really reject Mahayana 
understandings after all. A deeper understanding of Shinran is perhaps 
needed.
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The Canon of Mahayana Scripture: The Mythic Language o f Authoritative 
Teaching
We are accustomed to treating the collection of Buddhist texts as the Bud­
dhist canon(s). We translate Tripitaka as the “triple canon.” But the Buddhist 
canon, as a collection of scriptural texts, is so vast and so diverse that it never 
has functioned in the basic western sense of canon, that is, as a “rule of faith” 
(regula fidePy Rather, various Buddhist traditions select their regulative can­
ons from within that immense collection of canonical scriptures and so focus 
on a more limited and manageable scriptural authority, one that can serve as 
a “rule of faith.”
For Pure Land the canon normally consists of the Three Pure Land Sutras: 
The Larger Sutra, The Contemplation Sutra, and the Smaller Sutra. For Shin- 
shu Pure Land Buddhism, however, it is the Larger Sutra o f the Buddha of 
Immeasurable Life that provides the definitive and foundational teaching. This 
scripture, Shinran teaches, is “the conclusive and ultimate exposition, . . . 
the true teaching in consummate readiness for the beings of this day.”14 He 
makes this crystal clear in the first chapter of The True Teaching, Practice, 
and Realization, a chapter of his work whose extreme brevity may perhaps 
lead one to miss its significance. At the outset Shinran identifies the doctri­
nal framework for Shin Buddhist teaching as The Larger Sutra, and although 
many other sutras are cited with approval, and even appealed to as authorita­
tive, none of them is “the conclusive and definitive exposition.”
14 Ibid., p. 10.
15 “Names and Titles Cited” in CWS II: 271-93.
Even among these other texts, few focus upon the doctrine of emptiness. 
Dennis Hirota’s translations in The Collected Works o f Shinran, and particu­
larly the notes and appendices in that work, make Shinran’s sources clear. 
An appendix of authoritative Mahayana scriptures cited in The True Teach­
ing, Practice, and Realization— in effect, Shinran’s personal collection “can­
on”—lists some seventy sutras, only three of which relate to the teaching of 
emptiness.15 There are some forty-one commentaries (sastra), only two of 
which relate to texts that thematize emptiness. With the notable exception of 
the passage cited above from the Larger Prajhaparamita Sutra, all of the 
passages to which Shinran refers are quite brief and not very relevant to the 
theme of emptiness. There is a brief mention of a passage from the Vimala- 
lartisutra and its commentary on the image of the lotus flower, another brief 
citation from the Prajhaparamita Sutra Taught by Mahjusri on the practice
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of nembutsu, and a similarly brief citation on samadhi from Nagarjuna’s 
Commentary on the Mahaprajhaparamita Sutra.
Shinran was indeed familiar with the major texts of the tradition. He cited 
many scriptures: The Lotus, The Nirvana Sutra, a host of texts from the 
Ratnakuta Collection, The Awakening o f Mahayana Faith, and on and on. 
Clearly, he is conversant with the texts and knows the tradition. Never­
theless, Shinran was working with a “canon” (rule of faith) that is quite dif­
ferent from that often assumed to be quintessentially Mahayana. Its major 
component was The Larger Sutra, with its mythic narrative of the Buddha 
Amitabha. This means that Shinran does not privilege the language of empti­
ness, which in many other Mahayana traditions functions as a meta-language 
that empties all language claims of their final validity, and appeals to the ac­
count of the awakening and silence of the historical Buddha Sakyamuni.
Most traditions, western or Buddhist, can look to a diverse scriptural can­
on. Christians can appeal to a collection of quite varied texts with different 
theologies and sometimes quite distinctive teachings. Buddhists can appeal 
to a vast array of early and late scriptures. Thoughtful believers can further 
lay claim to philosophic models that direct and circumscribe their reading of 
scripture. Shinran, by contrast, has limited the authoritative and regulative 
canon (regula fidei) to one text, The Larger Scripture of the Buddha of 
Immeasurable Life. No other scripture, not even the other two sutras of the 
threefold Pure Land Canon, can impose their understanding over that of The 
Larger Sutra.
Shinran did not eliminate the teaching of emptiness from his canon; it just 
never figured prominently there in the first place. One reason for this may lie 
in the implications of emptiness in regard to Amida Buddha. In the above 
cited passage Shinran quotes from the Larger Prajnapdramita Sutra, where 
the identification of emptiness with cessation is followed by a description of 
Amida as an Enjoyment Body Buddha fbuddha-sambhogakayaf And 
Shinran, with apparent approval, cites the text of Shan-tao:
Now, through the examination of the sacred teaching, we know for 
sure that Amida is a sambhoga-[kaya]', even if at some time in the 
future he will enter into nirvana there is no contradiction. All those 
who possess wisdom should understand.16
Shan-tao here is responding to the question of what kind of Buddha-body
16 CWS I: 200.
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characterizes Amida Buddha: transformation, enjoyment, or reality.17 In In­
dian doctrinal development, emptiness was employed by the classical Bud­
dhist schools of Madhyamika and Yogacara to deprive of any abiding reality 
all Buddhas seen in meditative devotion. Asanga’s explanation is that the 
Buddha lands and Buddha bodies seen in meditation are “nothing more than 
constructions flowing from wisdom.” 18
17 Pas 1995, pp. 153-57.
18 See Griffiths et al. 1989, pp.32-39.
19 CWS I: 165.
20 Ibid., p. 153.
The doctrine of emptiness did not present itself innocently as an original 
teaching of the Buddha. Rather, it came down to Pure Land thinkers in a con­
text o f intra-Mahayana argumentation, specifically as refuting the abiding 
reality of Buddha Amitabha and his Sukhavati Pure Land. To accept empti­
ness as the definitive and conclusive exposition would in effect reduce 
Amida to one o f many manifestations of the basic ground of awakening, the 
Dharma Body. Then the language o f emptiness would trump the narrative 
account o f The Larger Sutra and supplant it as the basic teaching and rule 
of faith. But Shinran proclaims that “all Buddhas and bodhisattvas have 
dharma-bodies of two dimensions: dharma-body as suchness and dharma­
body as compassionate means.” 19 So Amida Tathagata “comes forth from 
suchness and manifests various bodies—fulfilled, accommodated, and 
transformed.”20 Amida is not merely a derived body of Buddha, manifested 
as compassionate means, for the two dharma-bodies o f suchness and com­
passionate means are inseparable.
Shinran will not allow the language of emptiness to swallow up the real­
ity of Amida Buddha. He will not admit that the teaching o f emptiness con­
stitutes a meta-language in which all other teachings may be expressed and 
to which they may be reduced. In this, he is but a clear example o f the basic 
stance of religious traditions almost everywhere.
Shinran’s canon, I would suggest, served the role played in other 
Mahayana schools by emptiness. This most authoritative of scriptures pre­
sents the Buddha Sakyamuni expounding a mythic narrative of the Buddha 
Amitabha. The events take place beyond this world realm and the actors are 
not historical persons at all. Rather, the transcendental Bodhisattva Dharma- 
kara, practicing through endless ages in endless world realms beyond the 
experience of any human, present or past, creates through the Other Power of 
his Vow the Pure Land o f Sukhavati.
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The very mythic structure of The Larger Sutra insulates it from theoreti­
cal attempts to filter its message through any philosophy, even the philoso­
phy of emptiness. Shinran does not allow its teaching to be subordinated to 
anyone’s logic of reduction, or anyone’s insistence on a pure Buddha nature. 
The mythic accounts of the beginnings of religious traditions throughout the 
world are, I submit, more real than any reputed historical facticity or any 
metaphysical constructions. Philosophies, not content with nor at ease with 
mythic narratives, often attempt to superimpose an interpretive language 
over the narratives. Here they may see the account of Amida Buddha as just 
another example of skillful means, an “outflow from the mind of wisdom,” 
in Asanga’s phrase. Amida would then become but one avenue among many 
to a unified experience of emptiness.
In choosing The Larger Sutra as the definitive teaching, Shinran was, I 
would argue, emptying all theories indeed, even that of emptiness— a very 
traditional Madhyamika move indeed! There was for him simply no philo­
sophic language that could trump the mythic account of The Larger Sutra. 
No theory of emptiness that could read some other meaning into the account 
of The Larger Sutra was to be admitted. Shinran insisted on the primacy of 
The Larger Siltra precisely to favor insight over theory, precisely to avoid 
subjecting the Dharma to the designs of the philosophers, even the philoso­
phers of emptiness. The framework of that mythic scripture disallows any 
more inclusive overlay to contextualize the story within its own meta­
theory.
If we can understand human understanding to consist in a sequential com­
plex of experience, insight, and judgment, theory functions by passing judg­
ments on the truth or falsity of judgments, themselves based on insights into 
experience. The refusal of Shinran to subject the Amida narrative to any so- 
called broader framework is a refusal to subject Dharma to human judgment. 
It is a recognition that, when treating ultimate things, myth is a truer and a 
more appropriate vehicle than judgment, precisely because it arrests atten­
tion at insight and refuses to filter salvific insight through judgmental theo­
ry. Here, knowing, found only at the stage of judgment, cannot reach beyond 
its limited sphere. The Prajnaparamita role of empty silence is in Shinshu 
taken over by the mythic narrative of Amida, emptying all judgment and 
rejoicing in the texture of its text. In this sense, to recognize the Amida nar­
rative as myth is not to reduce it or to subject it to a further understanding, 
but to recognize Shinran’s implicit claim that there is no further reading 
beyond such myth, no realm more pure or more basic than the Pure Land of 
Sukhuavatl.
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